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UKUBUYISA ISIDUMBU - "BRINGING BACK THE BODY": An examination into
the ideology of vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations,
(1882-1944).
This paper attempts to shed some light on the 'inter-tribal faction
fighting1 which has rocked the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations for
many decades. In this examination I have chosen to investigate the
Tembu/Mabaso - Tembu/Majozi disturbances of 1922 because they have a long
history which is fairly well documented and more importantly, the 1922
disturbances were a watershed in the relationship between tribes in Msinga
and set a precedent for other tribes in the area with similar land problems
and boundary disputes,. Most importantly I think the war provided a
model for local level politics among the districts within each tribe
and was an important contribution to the development of a1feud1( l )
ideology in Msinga8 Thirdly the war effectively broke Terabu dominance
in Msinga politics and paved the way for the Chunu people to consolidate
their power base and influence among those tribes which had been at
loggerheads with the Terabu. The final blow to the Tembu power came in
1944 when they were defeated in massive clashes with the Chunu. The
Chunu's slowly assumed the leadership role in Msinga after this and
their chief SiMakade, has now been elected by the KwaZulu government
to represent all the other chiefs in Msinga at important KwaZulu government
functions. The first section deals with a vast period of history and is
necessarily brief in sections.
Whereas the first section deals with the 'inter-tribal' wars between the
major tribes in Msinga, the second section deals with a new phenomenon
which starts appearing in the early 1930's - warfare between districts
of the same tribe and even more stunning, fighting between sections within
a single district within the same tribe. This breakdown of tribal
cohesion into territorial opposition between districts and subsections within
districts goes hand in hand with development of what I have called the
'ideology of vengeance' in Msinga. ( 2*) In the pages that follow I
think it will become clear that in trying to understand the conditions under
which this new social phenomenon developed, there is among all the other
numerous factors, a single underlying element which seems to pervade
the fighting at every level -» the problem of insufficient land.
Historical background:
Before 1910 the rural location of Msinga was situated within the magisterial
district of Helpmekaar and before that of Klip River although a large
portion of the reserve spilt over into the adjoining county of Weenen.
This section in Weenen was refered to as 'Pakade's' location, Pakade
being the Chunu chief whose people, were the most numerous in this area.
In 1910, 'Pakade's1 location became the 'Mpofana1 location and the
boundary between.the Msinga and the Mpofana location was the Mooi River.
This distinction was more of an administrative one than anything else and
the peoples living in these two areas form a cultural and political whole
as the major tribes in the area live in both locations.
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The Msinga and Mpofana locations are formed around 4 major tribes, .
These are Che Chunus, the Tembus, the Bomvus and the Majozi or Amaqamu.
The Chunus, Bomvus, and Tembus are all pure Ntungwa Nguni stock and Bryant
suggests that some 250 years ago the Tembus and Chunus were related.
.The Majozi are an amalgam of tribal fragments which were formed into
a 'new tribe* by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1869. ( 3 ) The Chunu and
Tembu were and still are the most powerful tribes in Natal. Just before
the rise of the Zulu power, the Tembus were subjects of the Bhutulezi
who were in control of the area around the white Umfolozi. The Chunus
were settled below the eTaleni Hill and they stretched to the banks of
the Buffalo River. Below the Chunus resided the Amabomvu people. The
Tembus fled when Shaka attacked and defeated their overlords the Bhutulezi.
The Bhutulezi chief sought refuge among the Ndwandwe while the Tembus led
by their ledgendary chief, Ngoza, fled in the opposite direction towards
Natal. The Tembu carved their way through many other tribes and kingdoms
during those initial years of wandering. They attacked and defeated
the Amakhuze people who became vassals to the Tembu and incorporated
into the Tembu army. The Tembu army reached a peak of military capability
during this period under Ngoza and they even defeated two regiments sent
by Shaka to feat them up1. This battle was fought over the Buffalo
River. Soon after the Tembu exodus Macingwane, chief of the Chunus,
'became nervous fearing quite astutley that the Chunus were next on Shaka's
demolition list. The whole tribe decamped en masse and followed the
path of destruction created by Ngoza's people, hacking their way through
those smaller and remoter chiefdoms that the Tembus had spared. After
several years of roaming aimlessly around Natal both the Tembu and
Chunu people straggled back to Zululand and to Shaka after their respective
chiefs had been killed. Ngoza was killed in a battle against the Pomlos
and Macingwane "disappeared into a cannibal's bowels". ( 4 ) Shaka
received the Tembus graciously and placed them under the control of a
headman by the name of Sojoyisa who was based in Northern Zululand while
the Chunus received a somewhat harsher response from the Zulu king. Ke
had Mfusi, the heir to the Chunu throne murdered. But Pakade, Mfusi's
brother, managed to conceal his identity and survive to lead the Chunus
back into Natal during Dingane's reign. He settled his people in the
area now known as Msinga. Nodada, the heir to the Tembu throne
waited until Mpande revolted against Dingane and then moved his Tembu
people to the Bushman's River, Here he was soon evicted by immigrant
Boers and Nodada finally led his people over the Tukela River to settle
in Msinga along the Klip (Mnambithi) River. The Tembu by 1882 had given
rise to a number of sub-tribes which had become politically and territorially
independent and autonomous. These were the Sichoie, the Amangwe, the
Emabeleni, the Abakwaqunta and the Mabaso. This last tribe is very closely
related to the Tembu and one of the Tembu chiefs, 'Mvelase owavela enyandeni1,
is reputed to have been a Mabaso clan member. Nodada married a woman of
the Sithole people who bore him a heir named Mganu. Mganu begat Mabizela
who begat Ngqarobuzana. Pakade of the Chunus begat Gabangaye who begat
Silwane who begat Muzikayise who begat the present incumbent Simakade.
The following section deals with the first inter-tribal war that was fought
in Msinga over land. Although the main fighting occurred in 1922, there
were skirmishes earlier on the 1905 and stick fights and general tension
between the two peoples since at least 1881. Before examining the 1922
war which was by far the most bloody, it is necessary to briefly study the
events leading up to the 1922 disturbances.
The Msinga location in 1881 was an undefined sprawl of 14 tribes none
of which knew exactly where their respective territories began or ended.
Of the 14 tribes only 3 were,
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"...entirely within the division. The remainder have
the bulk of their peoples in the adjoining divisions ,
having points running into Msinga. These tribes have
no laid-off locations but reside chiefly around that
portion of the location (or farms as the case may be)
where their chief's kraal is ~ kraals most distant
from the chiefs intermingling with the kraals of the next
tribe". (5 )
This situation was untenable for many reasonsfthe most important one
being that traditionally, the number of followers a chief had.reflected
his power and authority but this in turn was determined by his ability
to allocate land and secure tenure for his tribe and for other clans
which wished to KHONZA him, i.e. cede their loyalty to him in exchange
for land and grazing rights.
As the population of the tribes in Msinga grew, due to natural growth as
well as to other factors like the eviction by the government of squatters
and their subsequent placement in the Msinga reserve , it became more and
more important for the tribes to define the exact limitations of their
respective territories. Although the number of followers a chief had
reflected his power and prestige, too many followers could in fact
undermine his power in a situation where all the tribes were working
within an absolute and fixed amount of land. In other words, a chief
would reach the stage where there was no more land left for him to allocate
to new followers without encroaching on other tribal territory. However
he had no real control over the influx of people entering his region,
especially if they were sent there by government decree. By 1906,
"...the most fundamental prop of chieftainly power, the
chief's power co grant to his followers land and cattle
had been seriously undermined by pressures of population
within the reserves. While theoretically chiefs could
still allocate allotments of land this was not always
practically possible". ( 6 )
The chiefs however tried to overcome this threat to their authority
and prestige by simply allowing new followers and KHONZA-ing clans to
build their homesteads in the undefined 'grey* areas that lay in between
each tribe in the reserve. Thus wars between tribes over boundaries
in Msinga and Mpofana became a means by which the chiefs could increase
their constituencies and attempt to maintain their vanishing power base,
- their ability to provide land to thej.r people. ^ ^Another aspect of
the office of the chief which acted as an incentive to allowing encroachment
on other tribal territory was that the chiefs were paid a salary
through the magisterial division in which the chiefs kraal was located
and this salary was calculated( according to the size of his tribe and his
rank. ( 7 ). Thus when members of his tribe attacked another tribe in
a boundary dispute a chief was under immense pressure to support his people,
ami- it was very seldom that he did not, even though he would have to answer
later to the magistrate.
Population pressure was a very real problem in Weenen county's native
rural location and in 1880 the magistrate was already expressing concern
about the eviction of squatters and farm labourers from farms and crown
lands in the district:
.•./A
"There is a great question looming in the future which will
ere long call for the very serious consideration of the
government, and that is the location of the natives.
Whilst the native population is increasing in great
numbers and wealth they are getting less and less.inclined
to regular labour. The quantity of stock which they
possess is also a source of annoyance and inconvenience
to stock farmers, and all up-country farmers are more
ore less such. From these causes many natives are
called upon to remove from occupied farms. The. natives
residing on town lands are for similar reasons also being
required to remove, as the European population of the
village to which such crown lands or commonages are
attached becomes more numerous. Crown lands are also
about to be purchased or leased to a large extent by Europeans
and this will involve a considerable removal of natives there
also, and farms hitherto unoccupied except by natives are
being occupied by Europeans. On the other hand there is
not suitable accommodation in the locations for any
considerable increase in the present population". ( 8 )
In 1887 the magistrate, commenting on the widespread fencing of farms
in Weenen, points out that,
"Again fencing of farms involves to a great extent,
the eviction of natives residing thereon and as almost
every head of a kraal is a small farmer and stock
breeder, the difficulty of the evicted natives to
find suitable places wherein to dwell will increase
with the extent of fencing. I therefore beg to invite
the attention of the government to a serious consideration
of these difficulties," ( 9 )
In 1881, the issue of boundaries became acute between the Tembu and Mabaso
people. The magistrate reports:
"it has been found necessary in some instances for the
magistrate to proclaim imaginary boundaries between
tribes to prevent quarreling over gardens, it being
found that disputes were becoming so serious as to be
dangerous. There is at present a dispute of this kind
existing between the Amabaso tribe under Tulwana, and the
Amatembu under Mganu. It ha^ been goin£*"on for many
years and it is my intention to finally separate the
disputants this winter. I am informed that the
matter was brought to the notice of his excellency (Sir
Henry Bulwer) during his short visit to the division,
when such steps were taken to mitigate matters to .a
certain extent". ( 10 ) - my emphasis.
And indeed by 1884 Henry Bulwer had authorized the fixing of the boundaries
between the Tembus and Mabasos. (11 ) In this first official deliniation
between the two tribes, the government had decided to cut the Mabasos off
from what appeared to them to be a natural boundary, the Tugela River, and
Tembus were now as far as the authorities were concerned, entitled to
build their homesteads on the Baso side of the Tugela River. Thus
Tembu' 'land encroachment1 now received what both tribes saw as official
the support of the government and the Mabasos began a campaign of petitioning
the magistrate and government for a revision of the boundary. (12 )
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The main point of antagonism between the two tribes was the,
"...small Nokeshe plateau where the grazing servitude
overlapped and remained a constant source of dispute". ( 13 )
The Mabasos and Tembus were not the only tribes with boundary disputes.
By 1895 other tribes in the reserve had begun agitating for boundaries
to be demarked between their respective peoples. In this year the
powerful Chunus were involved in a dispute with the Bomvu people,
"...which led to the murder of a native policeman while
the then under-secretary for Native Affairs, Mr Samuelson
and the then magistrate for Msinga, Mr Fynn were at Tugela
Ferry discussing the dispute". (14 )
Their boundaries were fixed in 1895. The Magistrate stating that,
"the result has been little or no trouble has eventuated
since between them". (15 )
However in the following year the Magistrate reports that:
"Owing to the boundaries having only been partly
defined between several of the tribes, numerous attempts were
made to encroach on land under the occupation of
adjoining tribes, and several fights were the natural result.
In one disturbance, 210 natives took part; they attacked
their opponents no less than 5 distinct times, and to show
them that such small wars were not conductive to the
welfare of the country, the 2 indunas were sentenced to
3 months imprisonment and 15 lashes each, 64 of the ring
leaders were fined • The boundaries have now been
clearly defined between the tribes of Kula (Majozi) Mabizela
(Tembu), Maweli (Bomvu), Tulwana (Mabaso), and Silwane (Chunu).
They fully appreciated the action of the government in doing so,
which will encourage them to improve their own districts
without fear of being overrun by adjoining tribes". (16 )
However the Magistrates assessment was a little premature for in 1902
he remarks somewhat sheepishly,
"There has been a good deal of friction between tribes
owing to disputed boundaries. I have informed the chiefs
that the government boundaries must be observed and that
any persons not observing them will be punished. The
invariable reply is that the lands of their forefathers have been
given to other tribes and the people have not been consulted.
I told the chiefs that the country belonged to the king, and
that they are allowed to live on His lands as long as they behave
themselves, otherwise they may be removed to where the government
may direct". (17 )
This kind of warning of course did not take into account the growing
pressures put on tribes as they steadily increased in numbers and the
boundary issues between them began to assume a critical survival significance,
In 1905 the dispute between the Tembus and the Mabasos came to a head.
As their consistent petitioning for a revision of the boundary met with
no success, the Mabasos had no option but to gradually encroach on what was
in the eyes of the authorities, the Tembu side of the border. The Tembus
also resorted to self help. In his annual report the Magistrate for
Msinga declares:
— 6 *•
"Owing to an abundance of beer, several faction fights
occurred during the year, the most serious of which
occurred on the 23rd of November, 1905, between the
Tembu and Mabaso tribes. Had this faction fight not been
detected in time by the police and energetic measures
at once taken, it might have ended in the most serious
native disturbance that has ever taken place in the
history of Natal since European occupation, as three of
the largests tribes would probably have taken sides
and joined in. As it was, the Tembu tribe which outnumbers
the Mabaso tribe ten to one and is the 2nd largest in the
colony, killed 5 of the latter tribe, burnt eleven of their
kraals, destroyed a large number of stock, and looted a great
many huts, and kraals. These two tribes have been fighting
between themselves for the last twenty years and will probably
continue to do so until their respective boundaries
have been altered or the smaller tribe has been exterminated". (18)
As pointed out earlier, the Msinga location had a large portion of its
tribes residing in the neighbouring district of tfeenen, in fact the Mabaso
chief lived here. The fight in Msinga thus had repercussions in l/eenen
as members of the Mabaso tribe, living both in the location and on farms,
attempted to rush to the scene of the hostilities* The Magistrate
in Weenen describes the occasion:
"A long standing feud between the Tembu and Araabaso
tribes led to a disturbance in the Umsinga division
which might have resulted seriously for the Mabaso had
the police not intervened. With the usual rapid mode
of communication known to the natives, word was sent to
the members of the tribe in this division, some of whom
live'more than 30 miles distant, and brought a large
number of men into the locus in quo". (19 )
The authorities arrested those involved in the disturbances but the
prosecution
" was withdrawn at the instance of th.e government
who contemplated a revision of the boundary but
allowed it to pass neglected". ( 20 ) -
This failure of the government to prosecute individuals involved in the
1905 hostilities, pending the readjustment of the boundary, was a tacit
recognition of the fact that the fighting was generated by very real and
valid grievances which were rpoted in the problem of the general land
shortage experienced by the tribes and it was a problem over which they
had no control. Their only answer was to confront the problem immediately,
securing by force of arms, their territorial integrity and trying when
possible to encroach on other tribes' land. In these wars over boundaries,
jf hut burning assumed a crucial strategic role. The burning of huts was
I a means whereby land hungry tribes could remove people from the area that
if was coveted, forcing them to rebuild their huts closer together for general
jf protection and discouraging them from rebuilding their homes near the
'front1. In other words, the tribe being so 'moved' would find that the
area which had previously constituted 'no-man's land1 had been pushed into
their own territory. They would retaliate and move the 'no-man's land1
back at least to where it was initially or if they could, push it into the
aggressors territory. This would go on until one tribe gained a tactical
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at that time cut the Mabaso off from what would appear
to be a natural boundary, the Tugela River. Within
recent years boundaries have been beaconed with the
exception of that between the Amabaso and Abatembu. A
dispute arose in consequence previous to my assumption
of duty last August I discussed the matter personally
with the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg and
he agrees that this boundary should be beaconed. I trust
that this work will be undertaken at an early date and
will result in these two tribes becoming as friendly as they
were in the days before the Zulu war," (29 )
On the 6th April 1922, the Magistrate for Mpofana decided to implement
his plan for bringing the enmity between the two tribes to an end by
setting up a beacon on the highly sensitive Nokeshe plateau as a
provisional redefinition of the boundary between the Terabu and Mabaso
people. The Tembus were,
"...annoyed at the provisional redefinition.... and they
decided to take the law into their own hands, and did
so in a very complete manner". ( 30)
This redefinition of the boundary on the Nokeshe grazing plateau brought
to a head 40 years of tension and hostility generated by the land-boundary
dispute. On the 25th of April 1922 a Mabaso man was stabbed and thrown
off a precipice on the Nokeshe hill. The following day a fierce battle
took place on the Penduka Ridge about two miles from where Kula, the chief
of the Majozi people had his kraal. The Majozis were at this point on very
friendly terms with the Mabaso and Kula's people were hostile toward the
Tembu after a boundary dispute between them that took place before 1906.(31 )
In this preliminary battle the Mabaso managed to repulse the Tembu who
withdrew leaving A of their men dead. The fiery Mabaso chief Gqikazi
was a notable contributor to the Tembu retreat using his rifle with great
effect. The Tembus withdrew and waited for reinforcements. They
camped opposite Gqikazi's kraal which was called Emahashini - the place
of horses. On the following morning the Tembus attacked the Mahashini
kraal, the Magistrate from Helpmekaar describes the scene:
"Immediately on entering the gate we saw dead Mabasos lying
in all directions, each on his back, each minus his beshu,
disarmed, each bearing assagai wounds, afltf each having died
in action. The body of chief Gqikazi lay some two hundred
yards to the west of the kraal. I recognized him. He had
been stabbed in the right chest and had received several
stab wounds in the back, his left ear had been removed, and his
bowels opened". (32 )
In this action, the Tembus killed 24 Mabasos, most of whom were leading
headmen and indunas. the Tembus lost seven men. The killing of the
Mabaso chief deeply stirred all the tribes in Msinga, especially
the Majozi. Almost all the Mabaso kraals in the location were burnt down
and the women,and children of the Mbaso fled and sought refuge with the
Majozi people while small bands of Mabaso men swiftly retaliated by
burning down about 100 Tembu hutso (33) There were allegations that
before the battle on the 26th at Penduka Ridge, Gqikazi the Mabaso chief
had been to see Kula. This Kula denied. The Mabasos on the other hand
accused the Boravus of assisting the Tembus in the Emahashini battle, which
was denied by the Bomvu. On the 28th of April a Majozi impi entered
Tembuland and burnt down 5 huts. A small party of Mabasos was seen
accompanying them. by this time the police, assisted by a special squad
of reinforcements had arrested over 200 men and confiscated many weapons.
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By the end of April the whole of the Msinga and Mpofana locations were
in ferment. Inpis of Majozi were periodically seen in the hills itching
to exact punishment on the Tetnbus for the killing of the Mabaso chief .
A small impi of Chunu was seen in the Mpofana location observing the
situation and apparently ready to assist the Majozi if the Bomvus helped
the Tembus in any way. Apart from isolated incidents, the month of May
was relatively calm and police reinforcements had been withdrawn at the end
of April after the clash between the Tembus and Mabasos. In the middle
of May the Tembus were reported driving their cattle into the Bomvu
territory to safeguard them in case of a clash with the Majozi. These
cattle were expelled a little later by the Bomvu chief who did not want
to incur the wrath of the Magistrate or give the Chunus the idea that the
Bomvus were assisting the Tembus. However it is clear that the Bomvu
people wanted to help the Tembu. At the end of May, 1922 the Magistrate
for Mpofana writes: *
"Arising out of the recent disturbances there will be many
preparatory examinations, including two for murder, 1
(at least) for faction fighting with some hundreds to be
charged, numbers for arson, many more for stock theft*
Wholesale looting took place and over 3000 goats,
600 sheep and 250 cattle have disappeared" . (34 ) .
A calmness prevailed until the 16th of June. On that day while the Majozis
were paying their taxes at Pomeroy, the Tembus burnt down one Majozi kraal.
The kraal,
"stands on the inter-divisional and inter tribal (Tembu/
Majozi) boundary and is actually intersected by the boundary
line" (35 ).
Shortly afterwards another fJozi kraal went up in flames1. Before this,
the Majozi impis had been rather uncoordinated and their retaliation
sporadic. However, after the Tembus had. burnt down the two above mentioned
kraals, the Majozi chief mobilized his entire tribe.. Majozi farm labourers
living outside the locations began to arm, especially around the Elandskraal
area near Helpmekaar (36 ). The Majozi then swept into Tembu country and
burnt down 23 kraals, a total of 92 huts, including grain huts. Ngqamuzana
the Tembu chief had been specifically told by his magistrate that:
"on no account must he allow his tribe to retaliate in^any
way whatsoever". (37 )
On at least one occasion Nqgamuzana admitted to the Magistrate that he could
uot stop his people, however after the 'Jozi attack,'he managed to persuade
his people not to retaliate. The Magistrate had on the 17th of June
evacuated all the Whites living in Tugela Ferry and by this time troops
from Durban and Dundee had arrived. The troops consisted of 70 odd
men with 3 junior officers* Before their arrival the available police
force was 3 White sergeants, 4 White constables and a few Black constables (38 )
After the evacuation of the Whites from Tugela Ferry, scores of Tembu women
and children sought refuge there, as everyone was certain that a major
war would break out between the Tembus and Majozis. The special
police squadron did however manage to dissuade the Majozis from any further
provocative acts, and apart from wild rumours that the Chunus were arming
to attack the Tembus,"the hostilities gradually lost impetus and by the
end of July it was all over. An interesting aspect of the Mabaso/Majozi
alliance and the potential alliances between the Terabus and Bomvus against
the Chunus and the Majozi/Mabaso is that these alliances reflect the
political divisions between the tribes during the Bambatha rebellion
in 1906. (39 )
.../10
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The board of inquiry into the Tembu/Mabaso-Tembu/Majozi disturbances
found that the Tembus had been the aggressors and accordingly the Tembus
were severly punished. Traditional Tembu land was taken away from them
and portioned out to nearly all the surrounding tribes, so that a war .
that was ostensibly fought to gain land, i.e. to remove the Mabaso people
off the NOKESHE plateau, resulted in whole tracts of it being given to
other tribes:
"The Tembus have ever since 1922 read insults into every word
of the tribes around them. In that year they lost some
of their territory by a decision of the government, several
of the other tribes gaining at their expense - the Majozi,
Bomvus, Mabasos and the Chunus. the Tembu tribesmen remained
in the area and have never really become assimilated with their
new fellow tribesmen". ( 40 )
a n d . a • •
"Trouble exists between the Mtembus and Mabasos regarding
some land which the government confiscated from the former and
handed to the latter as punishment for a fight which
took place in 1922. The Mtembus had to clear out or become
Mabasos and would do neither, with the result that hut burning
has occurred periodically since". (41 )
The statements above suggest that the Tembus had some kind of choice,
i.e. to "become Mabasos or clear out". This can hardly be construed
as a choice as there was no where they could go even if they wanted to.
Their tribal territory had diminished considerably and in handing Tembu
territory over to other tribes the Tembus residing on this land were not
offered alternative areas on which to reside by the government. They
were expected to KHONZA the new chiefs of the tribes with whom they had
been at war (Mabaso and Majozi) and who were in Tembu eyes responsible
for the fighting in the first place because they had encroached on what
was officially defined as Tembu land. The chiefs and tribesmen who had
been awarded tracts of Tembu land, were equally disenchanted with their
new subjects who were responsible for mass hut burning as well as looting
and killing in their areas. There was absolutely no way that the 1922
land award could alleviate the tension over land, and if anything it simply
added fuel to the preexisting tension. Thus the relations between the
Tembus and their new chiefs and tribesmen was strained to say the least,
and it would not be surprising if they were discriminated against as far
as allocation of fields for cultivation and grazing.for their cattle
was concernedo The Tembus were in fact punished twice, once by the
government in that their land was ceded to other tribes, and punished again
by those tribes with whom they had fought what was, in terras of the 1905
criteria, a 'just1 war.
—In losing land to other tribes, the power and prestige of the Tembu chiefs
was severely curtailed. They hAd less land then before the war to
allocate to new subjects who were either moved off farms as squatters,
or had come from other areas to try and reside with relatives living in the
location. In this situation, the Tembus, the second largest Crib<j *n
Natal became exceedingly land hungry0 The Tembu had up until 1922 dominated
Msinga and Mpofana politics for nearly 40 years, and had been involved in
boundary disputes with nearly all the other major tribes. The Tembus were
also the first tribe in Msinga to actively implement their political and
territorial ideals using force of arms to accomplish their aspirations.
.../ll
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Simakade, a cousin of Muzikacithwayo would assume the regency. Although -
Giba as the dead chief's brother had a strong claim, and although he had
the majority of Chunu support, the government decided to honour the
dead chief's wishes and appointed his cousin as regent. (48 ) Muzikayise
rapidly formed a small and loyal following around him. His war 'general1
was a man by the name of Vukuza who fought in 1906 and saw service in
France (49 ) . At this time Vukuza was considered to be "... the finest
leader of an impi in Zululand and Natal"(50 ) . On June 1931 a couple of
thousand Chunu tribesmen assembled near Weenen to hear the government's
decision as to who was to become regent.of the Chunus. The government's
choice was delivered to the vast gathering by the Chief Native Commissioner
of Natal, escorted by the Magistrate's of Weenen and Mpofana and
an assortment of lawyers and police. When the gathering heard that the
dead chief's cousin and not Giba was to be installed and that
"....they must give him the respect of the salute 'Bayete',
the crowd began to growl and surge forward, while stones
began to fall among the Europeans.. (who) .. .retreated to
Lakhi's store...(where)... the windows were quickly smashed.
Suddenly a lull .occurred and the natives were seen trooping
over the nearby hill. It was surmised that they were going
for weapons and it was decided to make a getaway"(51 ) .
Before they could escape, Giba arrived and told the Chief Native Commissioner
that Muzikayise had no legitimate claim to the-regency and that if Giba
was recognized the white party would be allowed to leave unmolested. The
Native Commissioner and his aides managed to escape in two cars however, which
were stoned by women and children as they drove off ( 52 ). After this
incident Muzikayise's warriors led by the famous 'general' Vukuza, attacked
and decimated Giba's larger following. Vukuza1s men, "...routed Giba's
impi so thoroughly that only a few hundred are now in the location"(53 )•
Between July and August an estimated 500 people died in the civil war( 54 ) .
The government decided to withdraw their support for Muzikayise but still
refused to install Giba, especially after the incident at the first
installation which was thought to have been engineered by Giba. Giba
was banished for life to Harding, and a son of the deceased chief was
chosen instead. He was Bufawayo, the 19 year old brother of the heir*
The government, fearing a repetition of the violent confrontation which
took place at the previous installation ceremony took no chances this time:
"Facing two machine guns and fifty armed police over 100
leading Mchunu natives received the government's decision
that Bulawayo Mchunu... is to_be regent *£•• the tribe in
place of Muzikayise... A realistic note of warning against
further trouble was afforded by a machine gun demonstration
in which wooden boxes were shattered at 500 yards. The natives
were deeply awed" ( $5 ) ,
The Chunu people accepted this choice and the hostilities slowly came to
\ an end, although the effects of the war were felt for many years after. In
trying to contain the sudden outbreak of fighting in the Msinga and Mpofana
reserves in 1931, the government had to rush a mobile squadron of police
into the area. The authorities also resorted to "aeroplane demonstrations"
which were apparently designed to impress upon the natives the need to co-
operate with the government and reinforce the presence of the police. £6 )
"..••these have cost some thousands of pounds to the country
and it is held by some closely in touch with the position
that this money and a great deal of ill-feeling between
Giba's followers and the police would have been averted
if the government had asked Solomon KaDinizulu, head of the
Zulu royal house to step in and order the natives to stop
fighting" (57 ).
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Although the press and government opinion emphasized the civil war as
a dispute between two potential regents, there were definitely other factors
which affected the overall condition of the tribes in Msinga in 1931.
Commenting on the civil war the Magistrate for Msinga observes that:
"The depression in the towns is largely to blame. More
natives have returned to the locations, and without good
land for ploughing, and scarcely enough scrub for cattle and
goats, their thoughts naturally turn to their old grievances
and fighting. They openly admit that when the mobile
squadron leaves Urahlangana - where police have been
stationed for more than a month - more fighting will break
out" (58 ) •
iJWith a large influx of people from the towns during the depression years,
II tremendous strain must have been placed on the traditional mode-of subsistence
flwith its roots in land, which would account for the sudden upsurge in
inter-tribal fighting and tension. This influx from the towns was
supplemented by the steady eviction of farm labourers from the Veenen
and Helpmekaar Magisterial districts which surrounded the Mpofana and
Msinga locations. In 1921, the rural black population, of Weenen was
given as 20,799(59 ). In 1936 it was recorded at 20,953(60 ) .
Allowing for natural population movement, and other factors, the
• negligible growth of the population over a 15 year period seems to
indicate that a considerable number of farm labourers were moving out
of the county and the nearest reserves were Mpofana location. The figures
for Helpmekaar show a negative growth rate. There were 10,376 blacks
in the rural areas in 1921(61 ) , as against 8,666 in 1936(62 ). Again
the nearest location which these farm labourers could head for was the Msinga
reserve. Thus the Chunu tribe must have felt the results of a steady
influx of evicted farm labourers and squatters together with unemployed
migrant workers who were returning to the reserves for some sort of
. security, and their civil war, although ostensibly fought over the regency
dispute, must have been affected by the sudden strain placed on the reserve
lands. .
v . -'
The clashes between the Chunu and the Tembu which were temporarily
lulled by the general disturbances in 1931, resumed again in 1933 when
members of the two tribes clashed on 28th October, just outside Tugela
Ferry. In July 1934 they fought outside Weenen^nd they fought again
on the 12th, 20th and 21st of November, of that year. These clashes
were not on a large scale and although occasionally someone was killed,
they remained at the level of skirmishing. Farm labourers were also
very much involved in these small sorties. The antagonism between members
of the two tribes continued and reached a pitch during the Second World War.
There were two clashes in 1942, and in 1944 the Tembus and Chunus mobilized
their entire available forces for a final showdown over the Tugela River.
The trouble started on a farm where a marriage was taking place between a
Tembu man and a Chunu girl. The farm was on what was considered to be
•Tembu1 land. A group of Chunus accompanying the father of the girl to
the marriage became involved in a stick fight with some Tembus who were beaten.
The Tembus, beaten on their 'own1 land, fetched spears and stabbed and
killed four Chunus. Bulawayo, the Chunu chief, mobilized his entire tribe
and the Tembus took similar steps. On 30th September 1944, the Tembus
and Chunus fought each other on the boundary between Weenen and Msinga
districts. Each tribe fielded approximately 3000 warriors. The clash
lasted twenty minutes and the official death toll was put at 65 - 49 Tembu
and 18 Chunus,(63) it is interesting that the confrontation developed on
farmland and one of the most intriguing aspects of all the inter-tribal
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vars since at least 1905 is the role of the farm labourers and the
relationship with their tribes in the reserves. In all the major
inter-tribal wars, farm labourers were either involved or as in 1944,
the fighting actually had its roots in the farm area. Farm labourers
living as far away as 30 miles from the reserves took part in the fighting
and were loyal to their respective tribes. A crucial question now
arises and that is if the tribes in the reserves were fighting over land,
why did tribes who were settled on farm lands so far away take such an
active role? None of their homesteads were being burnt down,and the *
land shortage in the reserves did not affect them in any immediate sense.
The answer I think is to be found in the fact that farm labourers and
others who were squatting on Crown Land were quite aware of their insecure
tenure and that they could be dismissed or evicted out of hand. In
this case they would have to seek residence either on a new farm, or
ultimately go, to their respective chiefs in the reserves and plead for an
allocation of land. In participating in the politics of the reserve and
actively aiding their respective tribes in war, the farm labourers were
simply hedging their bets and identifying themselves with that last bit of
land which could, if the crunch came, supply them with some kind of permanent,
secure home. In requesting an allotment of land from their chiefs, the
evicted squatters and farm labourers could argue forcefully that they had
fought in their chief's wars and had not forgotten him even on the farms,
he now must not forget them in their plight. This I think sheds some
light on why farm labourers got involved in inter-tribal wars in the
•reserve. It does not explain why people in the reserves fought each other
over disputes which eminated in the farm lands. In attempting to answer
this problem it is necessary to look at the territorial models used by the
farm labourers. First of all, it is important to note that each tribe
in Msinga and Mpofana spilt over into the adjoining farm areas. Before
they were declared Crown Land or sold as farms, these areas had formed
part of the districts of the different tribal territories. Whenever these
areas were sold as farms the people living there were either moved or tried to "
stay where they were and sold their labour to*the owner in return for the right
to remain on his farm. By the turn of the century all of these traditional
districts had been over-laid by farm boundaries. But the injdigxnants
did not relinquish their own conception of their districts which had now
been completely disfigured as far as the farmers and the government was
concerned. The refusal of the farm labourers to relinquish the idea
/that they still belonged to a traditional district served to emphasize V
the fact that these were connected to the reserve and this link was at
the least a conceptual source of security. The labourers operated with
two territorial models. One was a small model which comprised of
boundaries based on the farm on whicff^they resided. These
farm boundaries were however incorporated into a much larger model which was
based on the now defunct, boundaries of their 'phantom1 districts. Thus
the old and indigenous model incorporated many farms and cut through farm
boundaries and determined where one worked and which farms were "in
your district". Any tension between districts was reflected in the pattern-
of alliances and employment over a number of farms which most farmers could
not understand. Secondly, in times of- depression members of tribes
which were living in adjoining districts would 'encroach1 on each others
farms and fighting would result. Although the farms belonged to whites,
the 'phantom districts1 into which the farms were incorporated 'belonged1
to the labourers. Thus hut burning was, as in the case of the reserves,
a martial device where by encroaching labourers could force those from
another tribe out of their traditional district (territory) and take over
their 'land1. If a farmer happened to buy a farm which straddled two
jOr more 'phantom' districts, he could be buying himself a lot of trouble,
(because he could be drawing labour from two or more antagonistic districts.
The indigenous territorial model was further enhanced by the fact thac
<*most of the farmers in the 19th Century around Weenen wereVabscntee landlords
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who simply used the farms as winter grazing and levied a rental on those
people residing on their farms. However, this still does not explain
why tribesmen in the reserves should become agitated about skirmishes between
farm labourers. Again the answer is, I think, to disregard the strict
magisterial divisions and farm boundaries and look at these 'phantom1
districts. One of the most crucial problems of people living in the
reserves was to find suitable grazing for their cattle, especially in the
Mpofana reserve. The tribesmen living on farms, especially stock farms(64 )
could, and still do perform a crucial function in that reserve cattle could,
in lean years, be 'SISA'D' out to relatives and members of their tribe
living on farms. These facilities were however limited as they were only
available to those people living along the borders of the reserve.
These tribesmen living insidp on the borders of the reserve, were very
interested in maintaining good relations with their fellow tribesmen
living in the,, 'districts' which had been bought by white farmers. If
a tribe, say the Tembus, living in one of these 'districts' was displacing
members of another tribe living on a farm (perhaps Mabaso) members of that
tribe living in the location would also suffer in that their farm contacts
would no longer be able to furnish them with grazing facilities if they
lost their hold over the farm. They therefore occasionally assisted their
fellow-tribesmen on the farms although not to the extent that the latter
assisted the former in the reserve. This was I think due to the fact that
in the last instance, the tribes in the reserve had more to offer the farm
labourers in the form of potential secure tenure if required, than the
farm labourers' ability to provide the tribes in the reserve with
occasional grazing.
Today there are many ways a man living on the edge of the reserve can
secure enough grazing for his cattle. The first and most common is simply
to approach the owner if he lives on his farm. If he is agreeable
then a grazing rental is paid for a specified period of time(65 ) . Thus
money earned as a migrant worker in the city can land up paying for grazing
rights on a white farm. If the farmer is absent, then the manager can
be approached and he is usually more amenable than the owner, because the
rent he charges is his and the owner does not need to know about it (66 ) •
If the farm is left in charge of an induna, then he can be approached and
bribed UKUDIZA as the case may be. If none of these options are open then
the cattle can be grazed on the farms without anybody's knowledge* This
is called UKUNTSHONTSHISA IZINKOMO or UKUKHOTHISA IZINKOMO (67 )-
In this situation the cattle are removed from their kraal at about 10 p.m.
They are driven to the farm fence which is then lifted, twisted and laid
down flat on the ground. The cattle are driven into the farm and allowed
to graze until about 3 a.m. whereupon they are removed, and the fence is
restored to its upright position(68 )•
The analysis offered above reveals ;:he complexity of the relationship
between tribal reserve and farm labourer - tribesmen as far as inter-tribal
politics in Msinga and Mpofana are concerned. There were obviously other
factors which also played a role in this relationship, for instance
kinship. When the members of a 'phantom district* which consisted of a
number of farms, fought against another .. 'phantom district', the
hostilities obviously assumed an immediate meaning and autonomy. In
such a situation kinship became a crucial means of binding members of the
different farms together, also enabling them to recruit kinsmen living
on other farms in other 'districts' further away. This of course could
expand the hostility so that many districts landed up fighting. The
initial structure of the fighting was inter-tribal, i.e. a number of 'phantom
districts' associated territorially and perhaps through kinship with a.
tribe in the reserve, would be opposed to another collection of such
'districts' belonging to another tribe in the reserve. These collections
of districts had their own chiefs who were usually appointed by the government,
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but some were actually related to the ruling clans of tribes in the reserve.
While the fighting on the farmlands still retained its inter-tribal character
a new and startling phenomenon began to develop in the reserves. This
was the fighting between districts within the same tribe. The Chunu
tribe was the first tribe to experience this breakdown of internal tribal
solidarity, and although the Chunus could present a united front to other
tribes
 >the nation was beset by an internalization of the land hunger as
districts began to regard their territories and grazing facilities as
sovereign entities, to be guarded and fought for in the event of encroachment
by other districts. The breakdown of tribal cohesion into feuding between
districts within the same tribe is intrinsically linked to the increasing
pressure of over population which generated a fierce competition within
the tribe over grazing grounds and land for cultivation. Whereas initially
the tribes and their chief could attempt to cope with the severe land
shortage by encroaching on the land of other tribes which also had the
effect of reinforcing tribal solidarity, this strategy became futile when
the districts in the central parts of the tribal territory began to experience
severe pressures from over population. In other words boundary disputes
between tribes only really benefitted those districts of the tribe which
were on the border. If they were successful in displacing the other tribe,
it was the districts on the border which gained more land. This gain
however had little or no effect on the districts in the middle of the tribal
territory and these areas began to explode into open hostility just after
the Chunu civil war.( 69) iiefore proceeding any further with this line of
argument it is necessary to highlight the structural strengths and weaknesses
of the Zulu political and territorial organization.
In his article "Die Zoeloe Isigodi ( 70) JOF. Holleman presents an excellent
description and analysis of the political organization of the Zulu and its
reflection in the organization territory:
"The political organization of the Zulu may be regarded as a
system of concentric units: The kraal (UMUZl), village group,
(ISIQINTI), ward (ISIGODI) district(ISIFUNDA) and the nation
(UMHLABA, or IZWE) „ In this system each smaller unit is
partially independent of and partly embodied in the next greater
one. The ISIGODI develops as a territorial unit after the
establishment of an INZALAMIZI ("progenitor of Kraals) which
has sprung up from an already existing ISIGODI. But since the
latter ISIGODI is part of a greater unit (the ISIFUNDA)
and the head of the ISIFUNDA usually takew the initiative
in the establishment of a new ISIGODI, the new INZALAMIZI
is regarded as an extension (in a territorial as well as in an
administrative sense) of the ISIFUNDA, Kings (AMAKHOSI) and
chiefs (ABANUMZANE BEZIFUNDA) can establish new IZIGODI in order
to increase their authority and territory"( 71 )
The above model was obtained from the Nongoma, Mahlabathini and Nkandla
areas of Zululand by Holleman in 1940. The territorial organization
of the Msinga tribes assumes a similar format except for the role of the
chiefs which was greater than their counterparts in Zululand. All the
land traditionally belonged to the Zulu king who installed loyal princes and
chiefs over the many clans and tribes, and who ruled in the king's name.
These rulers were called ABANUMZANE BEZIFUNDA (lit. regional headmen).
In Msinga however, the tribes were not united under one king. In
other words, each tribe regarded itself as a sovereign nation and until
1925 did not really recognize the Zulu royal house above the power of their
tribal "chiefs". This of course had been actively encouraged by the Natal
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UKUDLALA KWEZINSIZWA (lit. fthe playing of men 1), or UKUDLALA NGENDUKU
('to play with sticks). Although it is admitted that serious injuries
can be inflicted with sticks and that in some instances people are killed,
this does not alter the fact that the men were 'playing1. The death is
an unfortunate event but one which does not invalidate the 'play'
nature of stickfighting. 'War* (IMPI) is essentially associated with
stabbing (UKUGWAZA, UKUHLABA) and any weapons which puncture the body are
weapons of war i,e, spears, battle axes, firearms, (i.e. bullets) knives etc.
Traditionally, then 'playing1 between districts was a means by which districts
could cope with this structural tension in the territorial and political
organization of the Zulu. Among many Zulu traditionalists, district
opposition is considered to be quite desirable and even 'healthy'
as long as it was expressed in the UMGANGELA mode. It is argued that a
tribe with no inter-district oppositions could not possibly be a powerful
one because the warriors could not know, develop and trust each others
' fighting abilities. So as long as the expression of the district opposition
assumes a nplay" mode, it is quite acceptable. In the UMGANGELA each
'cheek' (UMHLATI/ISIQIMTI) contributes fighters to its districts forces.
The UMGANGELA takes plnr.e after weddings and for the young men involved
the wedding is often simply regarded as the channel through which the
UMGANGELA can find its expression. All through the wedding one notices
little groups of armed men from different 'cheeks1 arriving singing
UMGAMGELA songs and shouting war cries. All the cheeks of a district
march independently to the wedding and on arrival melt into each other to
form a unified fighting body representing their district. The district
'captain1 (UMPHATHI) then takes command of the whole group. The captain
elected by a vote from all the 'cheeks'. No individuals within the
'cheek' or its district may fight each other at the UMGANGELA and if there
are differences between such individuals they must fight before the UMGANGELA
or afterwards, but never in the presence of other districts. The
districts form a semi-circle of fighters and shout war cries at each other
over a distance of about 30 meters. There is extreme tension and the
captains of each group control their men with absolute authority. Those
eager to fight will dash out and GIYELA the other district (i.e. perform a
war antic) aimed at provoking a man from the other district to also
step out at which point the two will engage in battle,, Under no
circumstances can any fighter:
1. hit someone on the ground
2. stab him with the sharpened ends of his blocking stick or
with the point of the striking stick (INHLABELO)
3. continue fighting when a captain comes between the two
combatants for any reason,(usually b«eause they are holding
each other's weapons in a clinch)
4. continue beating an injured opponent after the latter has
shouted out "maluje!" or "khumu"!
When a man is killed at an UMGANGELA, the killer 'has no court case1
because they were both 'playing' and it was an unfortunate accident.
Today the UMGANGELA operates only in the Mahlabathini, Nongoma, and more
northern parts of Zululand, Versions of it occur in many other districts.
In Msinga it is totally absent and inter-district stickfighting here
assumes what a traditional Zulu in Mahlabathini would call 'war'.
This is an interesting expression of Msinga's historical experience., The
loss of the capacity to contain the opposition between districts by means
of ordered inter-district 'play1 fighting, can I think be seen in terms
of the following argument.
As more and more people entered the reserves to find a home, districts
began to stress their autonomy and independence. This was due to their
interest in guarding and protecting their already over-strained grazing
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grounds from encroachment by cattle from other districts. Each district
had its own grazing area and;
"Communal land tenure meant that boundary disputes could
not be resolved by litigation between individuals.
but were likely to mean confrontation between whole
districts".(72 )
Districts in this situation began to develop an exaggerated sense of
corporateness.(73) Each district had an appointed war captain
(UMPATHI WEZINSIWZA) whose job it was to coordinate the districts martial
capabilities in order to maintain the integrity of the district's 'estate1 (74)
In Msinga inter-district stick fighting was called UDEDE which basically
means a no-holds-barred clash. While a structural need to express district
opposition was present, the means to do so ("play" fighting) was not.
Although they still used the word play, its result in Msinga and in the
Zulu UMGANGELA was totally different. The reason for this is that no
matter how much the fight was called playing, the 'play1 aspect of it
had been over-laid by a whole new set of connotations. Losing a 'play'
stick fight with another district immediately reflected on your ability
to defend and protect your district's estate. This added a very serious
element to the 'play' fight. This was compounded by the fact when a man
was killed in such a clash, the dead man's district had to revenge his
death, for to neglect to do so would give the killer's district the
impression that the dead man's district was incapable of standing together
as a corporate group to protect its estate. If vengeance is not exacted
it will be said that the people of such and such a district 'have not built
their homestead's firmly', and reflects on the district's "firmness"
(UKUQINA KWESIGODI)
Now within each district, 'cheeks' also started to compete with each other
over land for cultivation and grazing which was held by the community as
a whole. This tension was contained simply by the fact that if the
'cheeks' fought each other, their collective corporate estate which was
held at a district level, would be threatened by other districts and
could not be defended because its corporateness was being undermined by
internal strife All the methods that the border districts used to sneak
their cattle onto farms were used by central districts on each other(75).
In some districts the tension between 'cheeks' became so great that the
district collapsed into a state of war between the different 'cheeks'.
When this happens a district is said to "QAMULA PIJAKATHI" which means to
'break in half or 'turn in on itself. The first Chunu district to
turn in on itself was the district of DUNGAMANZI ('Muddy waters1) round
about 1929(76 ) . v»ie district's 'cheeks' fought a bitter struggle
against each other in which many people died, neighbour killing neighbour.
This district still has trouble keeping its 'cheeks' together and they are
presently still feuding. The next district to 'break inside' was the
district of UTHUXI LWEZuTU ('Zulu dust') in 1935(77). One cheek led
by Chunus attacked the other which was led by-Zulus (i.e. of the Zulu clan).
The Zulus lost seven men(78 ) . Viiese cheeks foucht again in April 1957,
and 15 people were killed and 18 wounded(79 ) . The phenomenon of
'breaking ina-ide' of districts is considered to be a terrible abberation
(UMKHOKHA) by the Msinga people but once it starts there is no mechanis'm
which can bring the hostilities to an end.
In the 1940's the district of DUMAKUDE fought with the district of UMBANG0(80 ) .
The DUMAKUDE district also fought the district of EMADULANENI in February 1950
leaving ten dead and 9 seriously wounded. This fight errupted after the
Native Commissioner at Tugela Ferry had
"decided a dispute over the boundary of certain mealie
lands in the EMADULANENI and DUMAKUDE zones of the Chunu tribe".(81 )
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In analysing the structure of the hostilities between 'cheeks' and
between districts, a startling fact emerges. Because the
feud has its roots in boundary disputes and land hunger, territorial
affiliation to a district overrides your loyalty to your clan and even
your immediate family, if they reside in another district. An interview
with a war captain from ENKAKENI in the Chunu reserve reveals this point
quite clearly:
Q. "You are of the Ndawonde clan. What happens if your district
fights against another district and there are members of your
clan among them?"
A. "We beat them, we kill them. Perhaps I have a brother who is younger
than I who has built his homestead on the other side. We will try
and avoid each other in battle but my neighbours will Beat him.
I hear later that they have killed him. I take something and cover
him so that others can see that there was someone on the other side
who knew him. Your clan name is not important but the place in
which you live, there where you have raised your homestead".
Q. "But it does happen that sometimes a man will join the other district
because he has lots of family and relatives there ?"
A. "•• yes, but then he must move out of this district and go and build
his homestead with them".
Q. "So 1 am a Clegg who lives in Hillbrow, but ray family and relatives
live in Bellevue and its induna is a Clegg. If a war breaks out
between Hillbrow and Bellevue I have to fight my own people.
The question is now who can I ultimately trust?"
A. "Your immediate neighbours, your neighbours are the ones who you
trust. When you shout across to them, that you are being
attacked, they will help you. If they don't help you, you will
move away and say: "This place has no men. Such and such befell me
and you never came, such and such occurred and you never saw me.
In other words you do not regard me as one of you/—You see your
neighbours are your family. He_ is your brother."
Q. "Does this mean that your neighbours are more important than you
clansmen?"
A. Yes. For instance, my brother lives over th^re and he is on the
way to visit me. Suddenly my neighbour arrives. I will give him the
beer. I won't wait for my brother. I build a relationship with
my neighbour because he is the one who will see me through difficult
circumstances". (82)
From this it is clear that kinship cannot act as a mechanism for bringing
the feud to an end, although it can be used to identify powerful clans
within a district. In Msinga the feud is referred to as a blood debt between
two feuding 'cheeks' or districts. (In Zulu: ISIKWELETE from the Afrikaans
'skuldt' - 'a debt, fault, blame, etc). The act of feuding is referred to
as UKUKHOKHISA (lit.1to enforce payment1), or UKUBUYISA ISIDUMBU ('to
bring back the body)•
The Feud starts when one district or 'cheek' kills a member of another
district/'cheek'. The latter district must then attempt 'to bring back
the body1 of the deceased member by means of a body from the killer's
district. The people of Msinga explain this by using the proverb:
"Iva likishwa ngelinye (a thorn is removed by means of another thorn)".
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If the killer goes into hiding and cannot be located, any member of his
district can be substituted due to the corporate nature of the district.
When he is killed, his district must also 'bring him back1 with a body
from the other district.
Before the advent of the feud 'assassination squads' so prevalent today, the
hostilities between districts or 'cheeks* took on the form of a regimental
confrontation. The problem with these big clashes is that members of the
district working in the towns were required to take a few days off work
in order to go back to the reserve to confron the members of the other
district who had also left their jobs to come home and fight. The
confrontation would take place and those left alive would return back to
work as soon as possible to find that their employers had hot taken kindly
to the worker's sudden absence, and they were accordingly dismissed.
This gave rise to the assassination squads. A few trusted fighters
usually referred to as AMASHINGA would be delegated the task of 'bringing
back' the bodies of murdered district members and to generally keep ahead
in feud by keeping the other district's 'score' down. This little
group of full-time professional 'feuders' are supported by a fund created
by those men working in the city who would have had to leave their jobs
periodically in order to participate in the feud. The assassination
squad performed a crucial function in that it enabled members of the
district to fight 'by proxy', and keep their jobs. These squads are also
powerful forces within their own district by virtue of the fact that they are
very well armed and hold the lives of the district's members in their hands
as they try to ensure that the other district's'assassination squad'is not
effective. Although the scale of the fighting has been reduced by the
squads they kill more people than would have been killed in a big confrontation
because they are highly mobile, small and ruthless. The squads have their
disadvantages which are pointed out by older men who were involved in the
very early regimental confrontations. The advantages of a big confrontation
was that it was an event in which both districts mustered all their men,
faced each other, and in a huge clash re-affirmed their districts' intergrity.
The battle would become a major aspect of the district's history because
it was a social act and the deaths took on an air of legitimacy and
appropriateness. This is because each and every fighter, was able to
defend himself and the clash would therefore reveal the true mettle of each
district's men. It was more 'fair' and acceptable than an anonymous
assassins bullet in the night. After* the big regimental confrontation
it was said that those involved became 'satisfied'•
"The war must be fought. If the war is not fought.then the feud
does not end. On that day many people will die as both sides
sleep in the hills and wait for the confrontation. They will
die in front of your eyes and you will die in front of their
eyes too. That day the feud will lose its impetus".(84 )
The feud would die down until the generation of youngsters began to BODLA
(bellow, come of age). They would tell the other district's men that:
"You beat our fathers, but we were not there".
And the scene would be set for another big regimental confrontation.
Another interesting observation by older men of the regimental tradition of
feuding, is that the assassination squad stands to lose in a way if the feud
comes to an end. They are being paid to fight and perhaps it is not in
their interest to allow hostilities to cease.
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Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to trace the development of the 'ideology
of vengeance1 in the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations, revealing
its roots and emergence in the acute land shortage experienced in the
reserves. 1 have tried to show that the general land squeeze both in
and outside the reserve generated inter-tribal wars which developed into
a tradition of self-help. The continual influx of people into the reserve
placed an enormous strain on the tribe's territorial resources. Competition
over grazing grounds and land for cultivation caused districts and
'cheeks1 to stress their corporateness and autonomy as each territorial
unit sought to preserve its estate* This brought out and emphasized
the ever present but latent tensions inherent in the structure of the
territorial organization of the Zulu, Traditionally the latent opposition
between districts was allowed to emerge in the UMGANGELA which was a
cultural device ritualizing and containing these potential disrupting
forces and facilitating their expression. No such institution developed
in Msinga becase all 'play1 fighting was inevitably linked to the ability
of the district to protect its estate and 'play1 fighting in Msinga assumed
connotations which the UMGANGELA sought to suppress. The constant
emphasis on the corporateness of the district and its ability to defend
its estate from other districts generated a powerful idea of territorial
affiliation which played down and over-rode kinship considerations in the
feud. This de-emphasis on the role of kinship in the feud simultaneously
stripped the feud of a potential mechanism which could bring pressure on the
feuding districts to end the hostilities.
The struggle over land gave rise to strategies like hut burning where each
Cribe/district/'cheek1 as the case may be tried to force the boundary
back into its opponent's territory.
Finally 'faction fighting' must be seen as an active attempt on the part
of the traditionalist to maintain the infra structure of his rural
economy. The threat to this economy, is diminishing land created by
overpopulation. The colonial government gave the reserve an external
boundary but left the people in the reserve to sort out their own internal
boundaries|paving the way for the emergence of an 'ideology of vengeance.1
C
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